












In normal-form games, rationalizability (Bernheim [3], Pearce [11]) on its own
fails to exclude some very implausible strategy choices. Three main renements of
rationalizability have been proposed in the literature: cautious, perfect, and proper
rationalizability. Nevertheless, some of these renements also fail to eliminate un-
reasonable outcomes and suer from several drawbacks. Therefore, we introduce the
trembling-hand rationalizability concept, where the players' actions have to be best
responses also against perturbed conjectures. We also propose another renement:
weakly perfect rationalizability, where players' actions that are not best responses are
only played with a very small probability.
We show the relationship between perfect rationalizability and weakly perfect ra-
tionalizability as well as the relationship between proper rationalizability and weakly
perfect rationalizability : weakly perfect rationalizability is a weaker renement than
both perfect and proper rationalizability. Moreover, in two-player games it holds that
weakly perfect rationalizability is a weaker renement than trembling-hand rational-
izability. The other relationships between the various renements are illustrated by
means of examples. For the relationship between any other two renements we give
examples showing that the remaining set of strategies corresponding to the rst re-
nement can be either smaller or larger than the one corresponding to the second
renement.
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A notion like the Nash equilibrium assumes common expectations of the players' be-
haviour. That is, each player holds a correct conjecture about her opponents' strategy
choice. But once we admit the possibility that a player may have several strategies that
she could reasonably use, conjectures and strategies actually played may be mismatched.
This is what distinguishes rationalizability (Bernheim [3], Pearce [11]) from equilibrium
concepts.
Figure 1: The extensive form of G1
But rationalizabilityfor normal-formgameson itsown failsto exclude some implausible
strategy choices. Consider the following game in extensive-form given in Figure 1. At
the beginning of the game G1, player 1 chooses between her action X2 or letting player
2 decide on one of the feasible outcomes: 5 − 1a n d1−5 (action X1). Then, if the
game has not ended, player 2 chooses between the outcome 5 − 1 (action Y1)a n dt h e
outcome 1 − 5 (action Y2). The normal-form of G1 is given in Figure 2. It can be
shown that f(X1;Y 1);(X 1;Y 2);(X 2;Y 1);(X 2;Y 2)gare rationalizable; in other words, all
pure strategies are possible best responses and rationalizable in G1. But once we look
at the extensive-form of G1 (see Figure 1), player 2's action Y2 is an optimal action for
him whenever the subgame is reached, while Y1 is not a credible choice (Y1 is strictly
dominated in the subgame which starts with player 2's move). Therefore, (X2;Y 2)i st h e
only plausible rationalizable choice.
To avoid unreasonable outcomes, three main renements of rationalizability have been
proposed in the literature: perfect rationalizability(Bernheim [3]), proper rationalizability
(Schuhmacher [12]), and cautious rationalizability (Pearce [11]). We also propose anoth-
er renement: weakly perfect rationalizability, where players' actions that are not best
responses are only played with a very small probability. Nevertheless, these renements
may also fail to exclude implausible outcomes and suer from some drawbacks: adding
1Figure 2: A two-player game: G1
dominated strategies may enlarge the set of rationalizable strategies, while adding a pure
strategy which was already available as a mixed strategy may reduce the set of ratio-
nalizable strategies. To remedy these drawbacks, we introduce another renement, the
trembling-hand rationalizability concept, where players' actions have to be best responses
also against perturbed conjectures.
The main results of the paper are as follows. We show the relationship between perfect
rationalizability and weakly perfect rationalizability as well as the relationship between
proper rationalizability and weakly perfect rationalizability : weakly perfect rationaliz-
ability is a weaker renement than both perfect and proper rationalizability. Moreover, in
two-player games it holds that weakly perfect rationalizability is a weaker renement than
trembling-hand rationalizability. The other relationships between the various renements
are illustrated by means of examples. For the relationship between any other two rene-
ments we give examples showing that the remaining set of strategies corresponding to the
rst renement can be either smaller or larger than the one corresponding to the second
renement. Finally, we also show that all these renements of rationalizability possess the
so-called pure strategy property.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the rationalizability concept is present-
ed. Section 3 is devoted to the renements. We derive some generally holding relationships
there. Section 4 shows by means of examples that there are no other relationships between
the renements of rationalizabilityfor normal-form games than the ones derived in Section
3.
2 Rationalizability
We consider a normal-form game Γ(I;S;U), where I is a nite set of players. Each player
i 2 I has a nite pure-strategy set Si.W ed e n o t eb yS
Q
i 2 IS ithe Cartesian product
set of strategy proles. Let U =( U i) i 2 Ibe a list of all players' payo functions Ui : S !
R
that give player i's vN-M utility Ui (s) for each strategy prole s 2 S.L e tM ibe the set
2of player i's mixed strategies; Mi is the set of all possible probability distributions over Si.
Am i x e ds t r a t e g yc i2M iis a probability distribution over pure strategies. We denote by
ci(si) the probability that ci assigns to si.L e tM
Q
i 2 IM ibe the set of mixed strategy
proles; where c 2 M is a mixed strategy prole. The support of a mixed strategy ci is
the set of pure strategies to which ci assigns positive probability. A mixed strategy prole
c gives rise to an expected payo for each player. Let Ui (c)b ep l a y e ri 's expected payo






Ui (s). Player i's opponents in
the game Γ(I;S;U) are denoted by −i.
As general notation, given any set X,w ed e n o t eb yc h ( X ) the convex hull of the set
X, i.e. the smallest convex set containing X.
Rationalizability(Bernheim [3], Pearce [11]) for normal-form games is based on the fol-
lowing assumptions: (A1) the players are rational, (A2) A1 is common knowledge among
the players, and (A3) the structure of the game (strategy sets, payo functions) is com-
mon knowledge. Our formulation of rationality is based on expected utility maximization
given uncorrelated1 conjectures about the opponents' strategies.
Denition 1 As t r a t e g yc i2M iis rational if there exists a conjecture c−i =( c j) j 2 Infig 2
Q
j6=i Mj such that 8 c
0







Formally, rationalizability for normal-form games is dened by the following iterative
process.
Denition 2 Let R0  M.T h e nR k
Q
i 2 IR k
i ( k1) is inductively dened as follows:
for i 2 I, ci 2 Rk







such that 8 c
0
i 2 Mi :






. The set of rationalizable mixed strategy proles is the limit set
R1  limk!1 Rk =
T1
k=0 Rk.
For the purposes of expected utility calculations2, Pearce [11] has shown that a conjec-
ture over Rk−1





. Part (ii) in Denition 2 means
that player i holds uncorrelated conjectures (or beliefs) about her opponents' strategies.









N, 8 i 2 I. Bernheim [3] and Pearce [11] have shown that, 8 i 2 I, the limit set
R1




i is nonempty and closed, and that the sequence converges in
1Correlated rationalizability, introduced by Brandenburger and Dekel [6], weakens rationalizability be-
cause allowing correlated conjectures about the strategies of the opponents makes more strategies ratio-
nalizable. In the paper, we only consider the case where the players hold uncorrelated conjectures.
2The convex hull operator is used in Denition 2 because, when player i holds a conjecture about which
strategies belonging to R
k−1


















3Figure 3: A two-player game: G2
a nite number of steps. Moreover, Pearce [11] has shown that, 8 k 2
N, 8 i 2 I, the set
Rk
i has the pure strategy property. Let SRk
i 
n





i has the pure strategy property if SRk






i has the pure strategy property if ci 2 Rk
i implies that every pure strat-
egy given positive weight by ci is also in Rk
i ; the set SRk
i coincides with the set of pure
strategies in Rk
i: By denition, 8 i 2 I, Mi has the pure strategy property. Since, 8 k 2
N,
8 i 2 I, the set Rk
i has the pure strategy property, it follows that the set of rational-
izable strategies, R1
i , contains at least one pure strategy for each player. Note that all
Nash equilibrium strategies are rationalizable; therefore, every strategy which is used with
positive probability in some Nash equilibrium must be rationalizable.




i 6= ;; the
limit set R1
i is closed and satises the pure strategy property 8i 2 I; and there exists
n 2
N such that: Rk+1
i = Rk
i ; 8k  n, 8 i 2 I.
We denote by Rk the set of k-step rationalizable mixed strategy proles, i.e. the set
of mixed strategy proles which survive k rounds of iteration.
Consider the two-player normal-form game G2 (see Figure 3) from Pearce [11]. This
game possesses two pure Nash equilibria: f(X1;Y 1);(X 2;Y 2)g. Then, it is straightforward
that SR1 = f(X1;Y 1);( X 1;Y 2);(X 2;Y 1);(X 2;Y 2)g; i.e. all pure strategy proles are
rationalizable. Nonetheless, the pure strategy proles (X1;Y 2), (X2;Y 1)a n d( X 2;Y 2) seem
unreasonable: these proles are weakly dominated by the prole (X1;Y 1). Moreover, the
outcomes associated to these proles are risk dominated and Pareto dominated by the
outcome associated to (X1;Y 1).
To exclude these unreasonable outcomes, we consider various renements of the ratio-
nalizability concept, all of which require a rationalizable strategy prole to satisfy some
particular robustness condition.
43 Renements of Rationalizability
3.1 Perfect Rationalizability
Perfect rationalizability is due to Bernheim [3]. The idea behind the perfectness notion
is that each player with a small probability makes mistakes, which has the consequence
that every pure strategy is chosen with a positive (although possibly small) probability.
B¨ orgers [4, p.274] has given the following informal denition3.
Consider any nite normal-form game. Assume that every player has to choose each
of his pure strategies with a certain strictly positive minimum probability. Assume
that the minimum probabilities are common knowledge. Then apply rationalizability
to this perturbed game. Strategies are perfectly rationalizable if they are the limit
of rationalizable strategies in perturbed games as the minimum probabilities in these
perturbed games converge to zero.
Let int(Mi) denote the interiorof Mi. The mixed strategies in the subset int(Mi)  Mi
are called interior or completely mixed strategies of player i. These mixed strategies assign
positive probabilities to all pure strategies of player i.W e d e n o t e b y M i (  )t h es e to f
strategies of player i that assign probabilities of at least >0 to all pure strategies of
player i; Mi () f c i2int(Mi) j ci(si)  ; 8 si 2 Sig.T h a t i s , M i (  )  int(Mi) 
Mi. Formally, perfect rationalizability for normal-form games is dened by the following
iterative procedure4.
Denition 4 Let B0 () 
Q
i2I Mi ().T h e n B k (  ) 
Q
i 2 I B k
i(  )( k1) is induc-
tively dened as follows: for i 2 I, ci 2 Bk







such that 8 c
0






.T h e s e t o f
perfectly rationalizable strategy proles is the limit set B1  lim!0+ B1 () where
B1 ()  limk!1 Bk ()=
T 1
k =0 Bk ().



















3B¨ orgers [4] has shown that it is approximate common knowledge that the players maximize expected
utility using full support conjectures (with also correlated conjectures allowed) if and only if they play
strategies that survive the procedure which begins with one round of elimination of weakly dominated
strategies and continues with iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
4Our denition of perfect rationalizability is slightly dierent from Bernheim's denition: we assume
that the minimum probabilities are the same for all pure strategies and for all players. It is straightfor-
ward that every perfectly rationalizable strategy prole c 2 B
1 is perfectly rationalizable in the sense of
Bernheim's denition. And one can verify that all the relationships we derive and counterexamples that
we give, would still be valid if one uses Bernheim's denition.
5It is easy to show that for every >0 the set B1() is nonempty and compact, from
which it follows easily that the set B1 is nonempty and compact. Moreover, it is not
dicult to show that, 8 k 2
N, 8 i 2 I, the set Bk
i () has the pure strategy property,




ci 2 Mi() j for some c0
i 2 Bk
i ();c 0




i () has the pure strategy property if Mk
i ()  Bk
i ().
That is, Bk
i () has the pure strategy property if c0
i 2 Bk
i ()a n ds iis a pure strategy
that is given weight exceeding  by c0
i implies that the strategy ci where ci gives the
minimum probability  to all pure strategies s0
i 6= si and the maximal probability 1 −
(#Si − 1) to pure strategy si is also in Bk
i (). We chose to retain the name pure
strategy property since, for  small, the strategy ci is indeed close to the pure strategy si.
For limit sets we can always employ the Denition of the pure strategy property as given
in Denition 3. This also applies to limit sets of renements to be discussed later in the
paper.
Theorem 2 For every game in normal-form we have, 8 i 2 I, B1
i = lim!0+ B1
i () 6=
;. Moreover, the limit set B1
i is closed and satises the pure strategy property 8i 2 I:




i()=f s i2S ij9c i2B k
i(  )w i t hc i ( s i )=1−(#Si − 1)g:
Note that all pure strategies that are played with positive probability in a uniformly
perfect equilibrium, the equilibrium concept used for instance in Harsanyi and Selten [8],
are perfectly rationalizable.
3.2 Weakly Perfect Rationalizability
Unlike the perfect rationalizabilityconcept, in the weakly perfect rationalizabilityconcept,
a player is not required to optimize against her conjecture subject to an explicit constraint
on minimum weights, but her conjecture must put less than " weight on strategies that are
not best responses5. Formally, we dene weakly perfect rationalizability by the following
iterative procedure.
Denition 6 Let D0 (") 
Q
i2I int(Mi).T h e n D k ( " ) 
Q
i 2 I D k
i ( " ) ( k  1 )i si n -
ductively dened as follows: for i 2 I, ci 2 Dk







such that: 8 si;s
0













5This non-conventional way to optimize has been introduced by Myerson [10].
6The set of weakly perfectly rationalizable strategy proles is D1  lim"!0+ D1 (") where
D1 (")  limk!1 Dk (")=
T 1
k =0 Dk (").
The set D1 could equivalently have been dened as D1  lim"!0+ cl(D1 (")): Since
the sets cl(D1(")) are easily seen to be nonempty and compact, it follows that the set
D1 is nonempty and closed. Again, it is not dicult to show that, 8 k 2
N, 8 i 2 I,t h e
set Dk




ci 2 int(Mi) j for some c0
i 2 Dk
i (");c 0










i (") has the pure strategy property if ~ Mk
i (")  Dk
i (").
That is, Dk
i (") has the pure strategy property if c0
i 2 Dk
i (")a n ds iis a strategy that
is given weight exceeding " by c0
i implies that every strategy ci where ci gives weight less
than or equal to " to all pure strategies s0
i 6= si and the remaining probability to pure
strategy si is also in Dk
i ("). Summarizing, we have the following result.
Theorem 3 For every game in normal-form we have, 8 i 2 I, D1
i = lim"!0+ D1
i (") 6= ;.
Moreover, the limit set D1
i is closed and satises the pure strategy property 8i 2 I:






s i2S ij9c i2D k




: Clearly, all pure strategies
that are played with positive probability in a perfect equilibrium as dened in van Damme
[15] are weakly perfectly rationalizable.
Reconsider the two-player normal-form game G2 (see Figure 3). Remember that the
pure strategy proles (X1;Y 2), (X2;Y 1)a n d( X 2;Y 2), which seem unreasonable, are ratio-
nalizable. Nevertheless, none of these pure strategy proles are perfectly or weakly perfect-
ly rationalizable. Indeed, it is obvious that D1 (")=D k( " ) for all k>1a n dt h a tD 1( " )
is such that for all (c1;c 2)2D 1
1(")D 1
2("):c 1( X 2)"and c2(Y2)  ". Then, the set
of weakly perfectly rationalizable strategy proles is D1  lim"!0+ D1 (")=f ( X 1;Y 1)g.
Therefore, there is a unique strategy prole which survives this renement (or perfect
rationalizability) and it is (X1;Y 1), i.e. the weakly dominant prole.
Theorem 4 Every perfectly rationalizable strategy prole is weakly perfectly rationaliz-
able.
Proof. We have to show that, 8 i 2 I, ci 2 B1
i ) ci 2 D1
i .R e m a r k t h a t
B 0
i (  ) f c i2 int(Mi) j ci (si)   8 si 2 Sig and D0
i (")=i n t ( M i ); therefore,
B0
i ()  D0
i (") 8 i 2 I. Suppose  = " in Denitions 4 and 6, and let " =
(maxi2I (#Si))
−1. It is quite easy to show by induction on k that, 8 k 2
N,w eh a v e
7Figure 4: A two-player game: G3
that Bk
i (")  Dk
i (") 8 i 2 I, 8 " 2 (0;"). Assume B
k−1
i (")  D
k−1
i (") 8 i 2 I,
8 " 2 (0;"). If ci 2 Bk
i (") [it means that (i) and (ii) in Denition 4 are satis-









are assigned a probability of " by all ci 2 Bk
i ("); i.e.
















, it is straightfor-
ward that (i), (ii) and (iii) are also satised in Denition 6; therefore ci 2 Dk
i (").
Thus, 8 k 2
N,w eh a v et h a tB k
i( " )D k









i ( " ) 8i2I ,8"2(0;") [note that since
each set Si is nite, the limits B1
i (")a n dD 1
i ( " ) are reached after a nite number
of iterations, 8 i 2 I]. Taking the limit " ! 0+,w eh a v eB 1
i D 1
i 8i2I .
Theorem 4 would still be true if Bernheim's denition of perfect rationalizabilitywould
have been used. In Section 4 we will give an example showing that the converse of Theo-
rem 4 is not necessarily true. There exist games where the set of perfectly rationalizable
strategy proles is a proper subset of the set of weakly perfectly rationalizable ones, even
if Bernheim's weaker denition of rationalizability approach is used. This is in contrast
with the equilibrium approach, where perfect equilibrium can be dened in either way.
Consider now the example G3, taken from Myerson [10], which highlights how the per-
fectness notion (perfect or weakly perfect rationalizability) fails to eliminate all intuitively
unreasonable outcomes. As in G2, (X1;Y 1) would seem like the obvious outcome for the
game G3. There are three Nash equilibria, and all are in pure strategies; these equilibria
are (X1;Y 1), (X2;Y 2), and (X3;Y 3). Of these three Nash equilibria, (X3;Y 3) is not perfect
nor proper, (X2;Y 2) is perfect but not proper, and (X1;Y 1) is both perfect and proper.
The strategy prole (X2;Y 2) is also weakly perfectly rationalizable. Indeed, D1 (")i ss u c h
that for all (c1;c 2)2D 1
1(")D 1
2("):c 1( X 3)"and c2 (Y3)  ". Then, player 1 may hold
the following conjecture c2 such that c2 (Y1)=" ,c 2( Y 2)=1−2 " ,c 2( Y 3)=" . Given this
8conjecture, her best response is to play X2; indeed, 8 " 2 (0;1) we have that U1(X1;c 2)=
− 8 "<U 1( X 2 ;c 2)=− 7 " . Player 2 may hold a conjecture c1 such that c1 (X1)=" ,
c 1( X 2 )=1 − 2 " ,c 1( X 3)=" . Given this conjecture, his best response is to play Y2; indeed,
8 " 2 (0;1) we have that U2 (c1;Y 1)=− 8 "<U 2( c 1;Y 2)=− 7 " . Then, it is quite straight-
forward that D1  lim"!0+ D1 (") f ( X 1;Y 1);(X 1;Y 2);(X 2;Y 1);(X 2;Y 2)g,X 3 = 2D 1
1 ,
and Y3 = 2 D1
2 . In fact, adding the row X3 and the column Y3 to the game G2 has convert-
ed (X2;Y 2) into an weakly perfectly rationalizable strategy prole, even though X3 and
Y3 are weakly dominated strategies. Proper rationalizability is a renement which deletes
such unreasonable outcomes, like (X1;Y 2), (X2;Y 1), and (X2;Y 2).
3.3 Proper Rationalizability
Schuhmacher [12] has developed the proper rationalizability concept which assumes that
it is common knowledge that every player satises the "-proper trembling condition, but
the players have still no common expectations about the strategies of the opponents6.T h e
" -proper trembling condition requires that every player trembles in a more or less rational
way7. That is, the players make more costly mistakes with a much smaller probability than
less costly ones. Formally, given some ">0, a player i satises the "-proper trembling
condition if, given her conjecture c−i 2
Q
j6=iint(Mj), she plays a completely mixed strategy















"c i( s i)
Schuhmacher has shown that the common knowledge among the players of the "-proper
trembling condition implies that every player plays a strategy which survives the following
procedure.
Denition 8 Let A0 (") 
Q
i2I int(Mi).T h e n A k ( " ) 
Q
i 2 I A k
i ( " ) ( k  1 )i si n -
ductively dened as follows: for i 2 I, ci 2 Ak







such that 8 si;s
0












"c i( s i ) .
The set of properly rationalizable strategy proles is A1  lim"!0+ A1 (") where A1 (") 
limk!1 Ak (")=
T 1
k =0 Ak (").
Part (iii) in the denition is the "-proper trembling condition: if strategy s
0
i is worse
than strategy si against her conjecture c−i about the behaviour of her opponents, then the
6The properness notion has been rst introduced by Myerson [10], in the equilibrium approach, to rene
the perfect equilibrium concept due to Selten [13]. Schuhmacher [12] has shown that proper rationalizability
implies the backward induction outcome for generic extensive-form games with perfect information.
7The basic idea underlying the properness notion is that a player, although making mistakes, will try
much harder to prevent the more costly mistakes than she will try to prevent the less costly ones; i.e. there
is an element of rationality in the mistake technology.
9probability of strategy s
0
i is at most " times the probability of strategy si. Schuhmacher
[12] has shown that the limit set
T1
k=0 Ak
i (")c o n t a i n sa tl e a s tt h e" -proper equilibria: From
Myerson [10], we have that for every normal-form game Γ(I;S;U)th e r ee x is tsan" -proper
equilibrium. Therefore, the set of properly rationalizable strategy proles is nonempty.
Again, it is possible to dene a pure-strategy property, although the denition becomes a
bit more articial in the case of proper rationalizability.
Denition 9 Ak




there exists ci 2 Ak
i(") such that ci(s0
i)  "; 8s0
i 6= si:
That is, Ak
i (") has the pure strategy property if c0
i 2 Ak
i(")a n ds iis a strategy that is
given weight exceeding " by c0
i implies that some strategy ci where ci gives weight less than
or equal to " to all pure strategies s0
i 6= si and the remaining probability to pure strategy
si is also in Ak
i("). Notice that, opposite to the denition of the pure strategy property
as dened for weakly perfect rationalizability, it can now no longer be required that every
strategy ci that gives weight less than or equal to " to all pure strategies s0
i 6= si and the
remaining probability to pure strategy si also belongs to Ak
i(").
Theorem 5 For every game in normal-form we have, 8 i 2 I, A1
i = lim"!0+ A1
i (") 6= ;.
Moreover, the limit set A1
i is closed and satises the pure strategy property 8i 2 I:






s i2S ij9c i2A k





Theorem 6 Every properly rationalizable strategy prole is weakly perfectly rationalizable.
Proof. We have to show that, 8 i 2 I, ci 2 A1
i ) ci 2 D1
i .I t i s q u i t e e a s y
to show by induction on k that, 8 k 2
N,w eh a v et h a tA k
i( " )D k
i( " ) 8i2
I ,8"2(0;1). Remark that A0
i (")=D 0
i( " ) 8i2I ,8"2(0;1). Assume
A
k−1
i (")  D
k−1
i (") 8 i 2 I, 8 " 2 (0;1). If ci 2 Ak
i (") [it means that (i), (ii) and
















, it is straightforward that (i), (ii) and (iii) are also satised in De-
nition 6; therefore ci 2 Dk
i ("). Thus, 8 k 2
N,w eh a v et h a tA k
i ( " )D k
i ( " ) 8i2I,








i ( " ) 8i2I ,
8"2(0;1) [note that since each set Si is nite, the limits A1
i (")a n dD 1
i ( " )a r e




Reconsider the two-player normal-form game G3 (see Figure 4). The strategy prole
(X1;Y 1) is the unique properly rationalizable strategy prole of G3. Indeed, A1 (")i ss u c h
that for all (c1;c 2)2A 1
1(")A 1
2("):c 1( X 3)"c 1(X 2)a n dc 2( Y 3)"c 2(Y 2). Therefore,
10Figure 5: A two-player game: G4
for all c1 2 A1
1 (")w eh a v et h a tU 2( c 1;Y 1)>U 2( c 1;Y 3); and for all c2 2 A1
2 (")w eh a v et h a t
U 1( X 1;c 2)>U 1( X 3 ;c 2). This implies that for all (c1;c 2)2 A 2
1(")A 2
2("):c 1( X 3 )
"c 1(X 2), c1 (X3)  "c 1(X 1), c2 (Y3)  "c 2(Y 1), and c2 (Y3)  "c 2(Y 2). Therefore,
for all c1 2 A2





we have that U2 (c1;Y 1) >U 2( c 1 ;Y 2); and for all
c2 2 A2





we have that U1 (X1;c 2)>U 1( X 2;c 2). This implies that for
all (c1;c 2)2A 3
1(")A 3
2("):c 1( X 3)"c 1(X 2), c1 (X3)  "c 1(X 1), c1 (X2)  "c 1(X 1),
c2(Y2)  "c 2(Y 1), c2 (Y3)  "c 2(Y 1), and c2 (Y3)  "c 2(Y 2). So c1 (X2)  "c 1(X 1)",
c 1(X 3)  "c 1(X 2)  " 2, c 2(Y 2)  "c 2(Y 1)  ", c 2(Y 3)  "c 2(Y 2)  " 2.S i n c e t h e
probabilities must sum to one, c1(X1)  1−"−"2 and c2 (Y1)  1−"−"2. Therefore, we
have that A1  lim"!0+ A1 (")=f ( X 1;Y 1)g; i.e. there is a unique properly rationalizable
strategy prole, namely (X1;Y 1). Thus, although (X2;Y 2) is perfectly rationalizable for
this game G3, it is not properly rationalizable.
Myerson's [10] properness notion was motivated by the fact that the perfectness no-
tion has the drawback that adding dominated strategies may enlarge the set of perfect
equilibria. In the non-equilibrium approach, we have shown that perfect and weakly per-
fect rationalizability may also suer from this drawback. Nevertheless, van Damme [15]
has shown that, for the equilibrium approach, the properness notion may suer from the
same drawback as well. The game G4 is such an example where both the perfectness
notion and the properness notion fail to eliminate all intuitively unreasonable outcomes.
In Figure 5, we have the normal-form of G4 taken from Pearce [11]. The game G4 has
two pure Nash equilibria: f(X2;Y 1);(X 1;Y 2)g. In fact, these two Nash equilibria are al-
so trembling-hand perfect equilibria and proper equilibria. It can easily be shown that
among the pure strategies, only player 1's action X3 is not a properly rationalizable one;
11Figure 6: A two-player game: G5
X3 = 2 A1
1 , f(X1;Y 1);(X 1;Y 2);(X 2;Y 1);(X 2;Y 2)gA 1.
Van Damme [15] has mentioned a second drawback of the properness notion: in the
equilibrium approach, the set of proper equilibria may change when a strategy that is
already available as a mixed strategy is explicitly added as a pure strategy. This second
drawback is illustrated by the games G5 and G6 (see Figures 6 and 7) taken from van
Damme [15]8. The game G6 results from G5 by adding the mixture X4 =( 1−y )X 1+ yX 3
with 0 <y<1. We have that (X3;Y 2) is a proper equilibrium of G5, but it is not proper
in G6 when y  1
2. This second drawback also applies to proper rationalizability. Indeed,
we have that among the pure strategies, only player 1's action X2 is not a properly
rationalizable one in G5; X2 = 2 A1
1 and f(X1;Y 1);(X 1;Y 2);(X 3;Y 1);(X 3;Y 2)gA 1 .
Nevertheless, proper rationalizability singles out a unique outcome for G6, namely the
strategy prole (X1;Y 1), when y  1
2. These two drawbacks motivate us to introduce a
further renement: trembling-hand rationalizability for normal-form games.
3.4 Trembling-Hand Rationalizability
The starting point of trembling-hand rationalizability (THR) is that, in the denition of
rationalizability, the rationality concept is strengthened by asking that a player's strategy
be optimal not only given her conjecture but also given perturbed conjectures9.I n t h e
denition of THR, the perturbed conjecture puts weight on each pure strategy which
8This second drawback of the properness notion matters if both games G5 and G6 are considered as
equivalent games (Kohlberg and Mertens [9] have studied the equivalence of games; see also van Damme
[15, pp.259-265]).
9This restriction on the best-response correspondence may be interpreted as if the players have some
doubt about the strategies played by their opponents.
12Figure 7: A two-player game: G6
hasn't yet been deleted. Formally, THR is dened by modifying the iterative procedure
of Denition 2.
Denition 10 Let T 0  M.T h e nT k
Q
i 2 IT k
i ( k1) is inductively dened as follows:
for i 2 I, ci 2 Tk
i if: (i) ci 2 Tk−1







such that: cj gives positive
weight to each pure strategy in Tk−1
j ,a n d8c
0
i2T k − 1






.T h es e t
of trembling-hand rationalizable strategy proles is T1  limk!1 T k =
T1
k=0 T k.
In Denition 10, the set T1
i is the set of player i's trembling-hand rational strategies.
At each step of the iteration, a strategy ci of player i has to be a best response against
some perturbed conjecture. That is, at step k of the iteration, to belong to Tk
i ,as t r a t e g y
c iof player i has to be a best response against some perturbed conjecture c−i =( c j) j 6 = i2
Q






where cj gives positive weight to each pure strategy in T
k−1
j .A t s t e p k
of the iteration, no pure strategy in the set Tk−1




i ;k  0
o
is a weakly decreasing sequence, i.e. Tk+1
i  T k
i 8 k 2
N;
8 i 2 I.W ed e n o t eb yT kthe set of k-step trembling-hand rationalizable strategy proles,
i.e. the set of mixed strategy proles which survive k rounds of iteration. The limit set
is given by T1




i , 8 i 2 I. The pure strategy property is dened
in the same way as for rationalizability, Denition 3. We will denote the pure strategies
in Tk
i by STk
i . The proof of the following result goes along the same lines as the proof of
Theorem 1 and is therefore omitted.




i 6= ;; the
limit set T1
i is closed and satises the pure strategy property 8 i 2 I, and there exists
13n 2
N such that: Tk+1
i = T k
i 8 k  n; 8 i 2 I.
In Theorem 4 we have shown that perfectly rationalizable strategy proles are weakly
perfectly rationalizable and in Theorem 6 that properly rationalizable strategy proles
are weakly perfectly rationalizable. Since the ideas lying underneath the trembling-hand
rationalizabilityconcept are closely related to those of the weakly perfect and proper ratio-
nalizability concepts, we might expect that trembling-hand rationalizable strategy proles
are also weakly perfectly rationalizable, or even that they are properly rationalizable. In
fact, the trembling-hand rationalizability concept does not only require bad strategies to
be expected with low probability, but even with zero probability. Therefore, Theorem 8
does not come as a surprise.
Theorem 8 For any nite two-player game in normal-form, every trembling-hand ratio-
nalizable strategy prole is weakly perfectly rationalizable.
Proof. We have to show that, 8i 2 I; ci 2 T1
i ) ci 2 D1
i : Notice that ci 2 T 1
i
impliesthat there is no mixed strategy in Mi which weakly dominates ci; using Lemma




8i 2 I; 8" 2 (0; 1
maxi2I #Si): Remark that ST0
i = SD0





i ("): If s1
i 2 STk
i ; then there is c1
j 2 ch(T
k−1
j ) such that c1
j gives positive weight
to each sj 2 ST
k−1
j ;j6 =i; and 8ci 2 T
k−1
i ;U i ( s 1
i;c 1
j)U i(c i;c 1
j):Suppose there is
s
i 2 Si n STk−1
i such that Ui(s
i ;c 1
j)>U i( s 1
i;c 1
j): Without loss of generality s
i can




j )  ch(T
l−1
j ); 8l  k;
it follows that s
i 2 ST
k−1
i ; a contradiction. Consequently, Ui(s1
i;c 1
j)  U i(s i;c 1
j);
8s i 2 S i: Since s1
i 2 ST1
i ; there is c2
j 2 int(Mj) such that Ui(s1
i;c 2
j)  U i(s i;c 2
j);
8s i 2 S i: It follows that Ui(s1
i;(1 − ")c1
j + "c2
j)  Ui(si;(1 − ")c1
j + "c2
j); 8si 2 Si:
Moreover, (1 − ")c1
j + "c2
j is a completely mixed strategy putting weight less than "
on each pure strategy in Sj n ST
k−1
j  Sj n SD
k−1
j (");j6 =i; where the induction
hypothesis is used for the inclusion. Therefore, using that D
k−1
j (");j6 =i; satises the
pure strategy property, (1−")c1
j +"c2
j 2 ch(Dk−1
j (")): So, c1
i 2 Dk
i (")w h e r ec 1
i( s i)=";
8si 6= s1
i; and hence s1
i 2 SDk
i ("): We have shown that STk
i  SDk
i ("):
Since the sets Tk
i and Dk
i ("); 8i 2 I; 8" 2 (0; 1
maxi2I #Si); can only change if the sets
STk
j and SDk
i (") change, it follows that 8k;l  m; where m =
P






i( " ) :
If c0
i 2 T1
i ; then c0
i 2 T k
i with k  m +1 ;so there is c3
j 2 ch(T k
j ) such that c3
j
gives positive weight to each sj 2 STk
j and 8ci 2 Tk
i ;U i ( c 0
i ;c 3
j)  U i(c i;c 3
j); from
which it follows as above that Ui(c0
i;c 3
j)U i(s i;c 3
j);8s i 2S i:Since c0
i 2 T 1
i ; there is
c4
j 2 int(Mj) such that Ui(c0
i;c 4
j)U i(s i;c 4






j); 8si 2 Si: Moreover, (1−")c3
j +"c4
j is a completely mixed
strategy putting weight less than " on each pure strategy in Sj nSTk
j  Sj nSDk
j("):
Therefore, using that Dk
j (");j6 =i; satises the pure strategy property, (1 − ")c3
j +
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"c4
j 2 ch(Dk
j (")): So, c00
i (") 2 Dk
i (")=D 1
i ( " )w h e r ec 00
i (")(si)="; if c0(si)=0 ;and
c00
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i j c0
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The proof of Theorem 8 is only valid for the two-player case since it relies on the
linearityof Ui (si;). Surprisingly, Theorem 8 cannot be generalized to three or more player
games as is shown by Game G7 (see Figure 8). It is easily seen that ST1
1 = fX1;X 2;X 3g;
ST1
2 = fY1;Y 2g;and ST1
3 = fZ1;Z 2g:It isnot possible in the rst iterationto eliminateany
pure strategy of player 1, since all strategies of player 1 are equally good against (c2;c 3)=
((1=3;1=3;1=3);(1=3;1=3;1=3)):In the second iteration it is clearly impossible to eliminate
any other pure strategy of player 2 or 3. Against (c2;c 3) = ((1=2;1=2;0);(1=2;1=2;0))
all pure strategies of player 1 are equally good, so no further eliminations are possible.
Consequently, for every k  1;S Tk
1 =f X 1;X 2;X 3g;STk
2 =f Y 1;Y 2g;and STk
3 = fZ1;Z 2g:
Now we consider the weakly perfect rationalizability concept. Let any " smaller than
1=3 be given. Obviously, in the rst iteration again only the pure strategies Y3 and Z3
are eliminated, so SD1
1(")=f X 1 ;X 2;X 3g;S D 1
2 ( " )=f Y 1 ;Y 2g; and SD1
3(")=f Z 1 ;Z 2g:
In the second iteration, it is again impossible to eliminate any other pure strategy of
player 2 or 3. Next we show that pure strategy X3 of player 1 is eliminated in the
second iteration, although it is easily seen that X3 is not weakly dominated by any mixed
strategy. Intuitively, compared to strategies X1 and X2; strategy X3 is good against
the conjectures (Y1;Z 1); (Y 2;Z 2); and (Y3;Z 3); but bad against all other pure strategy
combinations. If every pure strategy is played with at least a small probability, then the
pure strategy combinations against which strategy X3 is bad will necessarily arise with
positive probability. It will turn out that against any such conjecture at least one of the
pure strategies X1 and X2 performs better. Let any c2 2 ch(D1
2(")) and any c3 2 ch(D1
3("))
be given. To simplify notation, let s and t denote the probability of the rst action of
15player 2 and player 3, respectively, and  and γ the probability of the third action of player
2 and player 3, respectively, so s = c2(Y1);t=c 3( Z 1) ;=c 2( Y 3)"; and γ = c3(Z3)  ":
Let us consider the payos of the pure strategies of player 1.
Strategy Payo
X1 2st +( 1−s−) t+s (1 − t − γ)+γ(1− )
X2 (1− s − )t + s(1 − t − γ)+2(1−s−)(1− t − γ)+γ(1− )
X3 2st +2 ( 1−s−)(1 − t − γ)+2 γ
Table 1: The payos of the pure strategies of player 1
Pure strategy X3 is at least as good as pure strategy X1 if t(3−3)+s(3−3γ)+3γ 
4st +5 γ +2−2 : So, if,
3 − 3γ − 4t>0a n ds




3 − 3γ − 4t<0a n ds
(3 − 3)t− 3γ − 2 +2+5 γ
3−3γ −4t
:
If 3 − 3γ − 4t =0 ;then X3 is strictly worse than X1: Consider the case 3 − 3γ − 4t<0 :
It only holds that the right-hand side, i.e. the minimum probability to be put on strategy
Y1; is less than 1− if t>1−2 γ=(1−): But then t+γ>(1−+γ−3γ)=(1−) > 1
since <1 = 3 ;a contradiction since the sum of t and γ should be strictly less than 1. So
only case (1) remains.
Pure strategy X3 is at least as good as X2 if t(1−)+s(1−γ)+γ4st+3γ: So, if,
1 − γ − 4t>0a n ds
3 γ −γ −(1− )t
1 − γ − 4t
or
1 − γ − 4t<0a n ds
3 γ −γ −(1 − )t
1 − γ − 4t
: (2)
If 1 − γ − 4t =0 ;then X3 is strictly worse than action X2: Consider the case where
1 − γ − 4t>0 :It holds that the numerator of the right-hand side is negative (use that
<1 = 3), a contradiction since s should be positive. So only case (2) remains.
Concluding, X3 may be a best response of player 1 if
1 − γ − 4t<0<3−3 γ−4 t
and
3γ −γ −(1− )t
1 − γ − 4t
 s 
(3 − 3)t − 3γ − 2 +2+5 γ
3−3γ −4t
:
16Next it is shown that the latter inequality can never be satised since the rst term is
always bigger than the third. Now, 1 − γ − 4t<0<3−3 γ−4 tand (3γ − γ − (1 −
)t)=(1− γ − 4t)  ((3 − 3)t − 3γ − 2 +2+5 γ)=(3− 3γ − 4t) implies
t2(4 − 4)+t (4 − 4+4 γ−4 γ)+1−−γ−γ +2 γ2  0: (3)
The left-hand side of (3) is a quadratic function in t: Computing \b2−4ac" to nd the zero
points of this function yields 16γ(γ−1)(1−4+32) which is smaller than 0 (use <1 = 3).
Therefore, the quadratic function in t has no zero points. By trying any value of the
parameters, one sees that the left-hand side of (3) is actually positive everywhere, leading
to a contradiction. Consequently, there are no values of s and t; given any ;γ < 1=3; for
which X3 is the best response. So, X3 can be eliminated. After this no further eliminations
are possible. Consequently, for every k  2;S D k
1( " )=f X 1 ;X 2gSTk
1 = fX1;X 2;X 3g;
SDk
2(")=STk
2 = fY1;Y 2g;and SDk
3(")=STk
3 = fZ1;Z 2g:
In many games, trembling-hand rationalizability can rule out implausible strategies
that cannot be excluded by proper rationalizability (although in Section 4 we show that
even for two-playernormal-formgames trembling-hand rationalizabilityis not a renement
of proper rationalizability). In Game G4, once we apply our concept THR, we obtain the
following iterative deletion of pure strategy proles: ST1 = f(X2;Y 1);(X 1;Y 2);( X 2;Y 2);
(X 1;Y 1)g; ST2 = f(X2;Y 1);(X 1;Y 1)g; T3 = f(X 2;Y 1)g. Once player 1 will never play
X3, player 2's action Y2 is never a best response against any trembling conjecture which
puts weight on X1 and X2. Therefore, Y1 is the unique trembling-hand rationalizable
strategy of player 2. Knowing that player 2's choice is Y1, player 1's best response is to
play X2 which is player 1's unique trembling-hand rationalizable strategy. In both G2
and G3, the strategy prole (X1;Y 1) is the unique trembling-hand rationalizable strategy
prole. Game G4 shows that sometimes it is possible to eliminate unreasonable strategies
by means of trembling-hand rationalizabilitywhich cannot be eliminated by weakly perfect
rationalizability, proper rationalizability, or even the proper equilibrium concept since the
strategy prole (X1;Y 2) constitutes a proper equilibrium in Game G4.
For some games the commonality of the knowledge that players are trembling-hand
rational runs into problems. The following example10 illustrates this inconsistency. In
G8 (see Figure 9), trembling-hand rationalizability singles out the unique strategy prole
(X1;Y 1). Player 1 has two pure strategies; S1 = fX1;X 2g. Player 2 has also two pure
strategies; S2 = fY1;Y 2g. It is quite obvious that T1
1 = T1
1 = fX1g and T1
2 = T1
2 = fY1g.
10This inconsistency problem has been studied by B¨ orgers and Samuelson [5]. To resolve such an
inconsistency of common knowledge of cautious rationality, Asheim and Dufwenberg [1] have changed the
object for the common knowledge: instead of common knowledge of rational choice, they assume common
knowledge of rational reasoning.
17Figure 9: A two-player game: G8
Mutual knowledge of order 1 of trembling-hand rationality means that player 1 knows that
player 2 will play Y1. Therefore, player 1 is indierent in playing X1 or X2. Nevertheless,
the action X2 is not trembling-hand rationalizable. The logical problem is: why should
player 1 play a trembling-hand rationalizable strategy if player 1 knows that player 2 will
play a trembling-hand rationalizable strategy?
Let T
0  M.T h e n T
k
Q
i 2 I T
k
i( k  1) is inductively dened as follows: for
i 2 I, ci 2 T
k








such that: (iii) cj gives
positive weight to each pure strategy in T
k−1
j ;( i v )8c
0







Thus each set T
k
i consists of unconstrained best responses, while each set Tk
i consists
of constrained best responses. The dierence between the two iterative procedures that
yield the sets T
k
i and Tk
i is that, in the kth step of the construction of the sets Tk
i ,o n l y
trembling-hand best responses among the sets Tk−1
i of surviving strategies are considered.
Strategies which have already been eliminated at a previous step as not trembling-hand
rationalizable should never be readmitted into the set of trembling-hand rationalizable
strategies. But a renement of rationalizability admitting unconstrained best responses
runs into problems since the limit set T
1  limk!1 T
k may not exist. As an example,
reconsider brieﬂy Game G8. For player 1, we have that T
k
1 = M1 if k even and T
k
1 = fX1g
if k odd, whereas, 8 k>0, Tk
1 = fX1g. For player 2, we have that T
k
2 = M2 if k even and
T
k
2 = fY1g if k odd, whereas, 8 k>0, Tk
2 = fY1g.
Also the perfect, weakly perfect and proper rationalizability concepts suer from a
similardrawback albeit in a somewhat moredisguised form. As long as  and " are positive,
no problems arise as can be easily seen from the denitions of the sets Bk();D k( " ) ;and
Ak(") (Denitions 4, 6, and 8, respectively). However, for the limit sets B1;D 1; and
A1 exactly the same problem arises as can be veried by means of Game G8, since for
all concepts only the strategies X1 and Y1 remain. Again: why should player 1 stick to
strategy X1 if player 1 knows that player 2 will play Y1?
183.5 Cautious Rationalizability
Cautious rationalizability, due to Pearce [11], imposes the condition on the set of ratio-
nalizable strategy proles that the players do not take unnecessary risks. This condition
requires that the players' conjectures give positive weight to all rationalizable alterna-
tives, whereas the strategy proles that are not rationalizable should be given zero weight.
Formally, cautious rationalizability is dened by the following iterative procedure.
Denition 11 Let C0  M.T h e nC k
Q
i 2 IC k
i ( k1 ) is inductively dened as follows:
for i 2 I, ci 2 Ck

























C k − 1

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is player i's set of rationalizable strategies given that the





is the limit set
R1
i of the iterative procedure of Denition 2 starting with R0  Ck−1. In Denition 11, at
each step of the iterative procedure, strategies that are not best responses are eliminated




Consider the following example taken from Pearce [11]. Figure 10 gives us the payo
matrix of the normal-form game G9. In G9, action X2 of player 1 is not perfectly nor
weakly perfectly nor properly nor trembling-hand rationalizable. However, this action is
cautiously rationalizable: SC1
1 = fX1;X 2gand C1
2 = fY1g. Pearce [11] has shown that,
8 i 2 I, the limit set C1
i is nonempty, closed, and satises the pure strategy property.




i 6= ;; the
limit set C1
i is closed and satises the pure strategy property 8i 2 I; and there exists
n 2
N such that: Ck+1
i = Ck
i 8k  n; 8i 2 I:
The next section will make clear that the set of cautiously rationable strategy proles
can be either smaller or bigger than the set of strategy proles obtained by any other
renement of rationalizability.
4 The Remaining Relationships
4.1 Two More Examples
The rst example, G10, is due to B¨ orgers [4]. Figure 11 gives us the payo matrix of this
two-player normal-form game. In G10, player 1's pure strategies or actions X1;X 2;X 3and
19Figure 10: A two-player game: G9
Figure 11: A two-player game: G10
player 2's actions Y1;Y 2;Y 3 are properly, trembling-hand, and cautiously rationalizable.
Meanwhile, only player 1's actions X1;X 2and player 2's action Y2 are perfectly rationaliz-
able in G10. Given both examples G10 and G3, we conclude that there is no relationship
between perfect rationalizabilityand these other renements (proper, trembling-hand, and
cautious rationalizability): perfect rationalizability may be weaker (example G3) or even
stronger (example G10). Even if Bernheim's weaker denition of perfect rationalizability
would be used, it would still be possible to eliminate pure strategy X3 in G10.
The second example is the two-player normal-form game G11. Figure 12 gives us
the payo matrix of G11. In G11, proper and cautious rationalizability single out a
unique strategy prole: (X1;Y 2). Nevertheless, player 2's action Y1 is trembling-hand
rationalizable: T1
1 = fX1g and T1
2 = M2. Therefore, there is no relationship between
trembling-hand rationalizability and proper or cautious rationalizability: trembling-hand
rationalizability may be weaker (Example G11) or stronger (Examples G9 and G4).
20Figure 12: A two-player game: G11
4.2 The Burning Money Game
Before concluding we brieﬂy consider Ben-Porath and Dekel's [2] burning money game to
get more insight into the consequences of using a particular renement. This two-stage
game is based on an idea of van Damme [14]. In the rst stage, player 1 has a choice
between her action B (burn money) that leads to a loss of 2 units of utility for her, and
her action N (not burn money). After this choice is observed, player 1 and player 2 play a
simultaneous-move game of coordination (see Figure 13). After the action N the payos
are given by the right-hand matrix. After the action B the payos are given by the left-
hand matrix; compared with the right-hand matrix, player 1's payos have all been reduced
by 2 units, but player 2's payos are exactly the same. In the corresponding normal-form of
this game (see Figure 14), player 1 has four pure strategies; S1 = fBX1;BX 2;NX 1;NX 2g.
Player 2 has also four pure strategies; S2 = fY1Y1;Y 1Y 2;Y 2Y 1;Y 2Y 2g. The pure strategy
Y1Y2 of player 2 means that he plays Y1 if player 1 has burned money while he plays Y2
otherwise.
For this burning money game, trembling-hand rationalizability singles out a unique
strategy prole: (NX1;Y 1Y 1); that is, the fact that player 1 could have chosen to burn
utility but did not do so ensures that she obtains her most preferred outcome. Indeed, in
the game G12, once we apply our concept THR, we obtain the following iterative deletion
of pure strategies: BX2 = 2 ST1
1; Y2Y1;Y 2Y 2 = 2ST2
2; BX2;NX 2 = 2ST3
1; Y2Y1;Y 2Y 2;Y 1Y 2 = 2
ST4
2 = fY1Y1g; BX1;BX 2;NX 2 = 2 ST5
1 = fNX1g; T5 = f(NX1;Y 1Y 1)g. Nevertheless,
player 1's action BX1 (where player 1 burns money) is properly rationalizable. Indeed,
A1 (") is such that for all (c1;c 2)2A 1
1(")A 1
2("):c 1( BX2)  "c 1(NX1)a n dc 1( BX2) 
"c 1(NX2). Given these restrictions, for each pure strategy of player 2 there exists a conjec-
21Figure 13: The burning money game
Figure 14: Ben-Porath and Dekel's burning money game: G12
22ture c1 2 A1
1 (") such that it is a best response against c1. Indeed, for all c1 2 A1
1 ("), player
2's expected payos are: U2 (c1;Y 1Y 1)=c 1( BX1)+c 1(NX1); U2 (c1;Y 1Y 2)=c 1( BX1)+
5c 1(NX2); U2 (c1;Y 2Y 1)=5 c 1( BX2)+c 1( NX1)  (1 + 5") c1 (NX1); U2(c1;Y 2Y 2)=
5 c 1( BX2)+5c 1( NX2)  (5 + 5") c1 (NX2). For example, for all " 2 (0;1), each
pure strategy of player 2 is a best response against the conjecture c1 2 A1
1 (") dened





each pure strategy of player 1 belonging to fBX1;NX 1;NX 2g there exists a conjecture
c2 2 A2
2 (") such that it is a best response against c2. For example, each pure strate-
gy belonging to fBX1;NX 1;NX 2gis a best response against the conjecture c2 2 A1
2(")
dened by c2 (Y1Y1)= 1
12;c 2(Y 1Y 2)=29
60;c 2(Y 2Y 1)= 1
12;c 2(Y 2Y 2)= 7
20: Then, the set-
s of properly rationalizable strategies are the limit sets A1
1 f BX1;NX 1;NX 2g and
A1
2 f Y 1Y 1;Y 1Y 2;Y 2Y 1;Y 2Y 2g; only player 1's pure strategy BX2 does not belong to A1
1 .
Note that (NX1;Y 1Y 1) is also the unique cautiously rationalizable strategy prole, with
(5;1) as the resulting payos. Therefore, trembling-hand and cautious rationalizability
single out the outcome of forward induction (see Ben-Porath and Dekel [2], Hammond
[7], van Damme [14]), while proper rationalizability (or weakly perfect rationalizability or
perfect rationalizability) does not.
4.3 Conclusion
We conclude by summarizing the relationships between the renements of rationalizability
for normal-form games (see Table 2).
B1  D1 Theorem
Perfect rationalizability Weakly perfect rationalizability 4
A1  D1 Theorem
Proper rationalizability Weakly perfect rationalizability 6
T1  D1 Theorem
Trembling-hand rationalizability Weakly perfect rationalizability 8
2-person games
Table 2: The relationships between the renements
We have shown the relationship between perfect rationalizability and weakly perfect
rationalizability(see Theorem 4) as well as the relationship between proper rationalizabili-
ty and weakly perfect rationalizability (see Theorem 6): weakly perfect rationalizability is
a weaker renement than both perfect and proper rationalizability. Moreover, for 2-player
normal-form games it holds that weakly perfect rationalizability is a weaker renement
23than trembling-hand rationalizability (see Theorem 8). Unfortunately, there is no rela-
tionship between the other renements (see Table 3).
A1  T1 Example G11, Figure 12
A1  T1 Example G12, Figure 14
B1  T1 Example G10, Figure 11
B1  T1 Example G3, Figure 4
T1  C1 Example G9, Figure 10
T1  C1 Example G11, Figure 12
D1  T1 Example G7, Figure 8
D1  T1 Example G3, Figure 4
C1  A1 Example G12, Figure 14
C1  A1 Example G9, Figure 10
D1  C1 Example G9, Figure 10
D1  C1 Example G3, Figure 4
C1  B1 Example G3, Figure 4
C1  B1 Example G9, Figure 10
A1  B1 Example G3, Figure 4
A1  B1 Example G10, Figure 11
A1 : set of properly rationalizable strategy proles
B1 : set of perfectly rationalizable strategy proles
C1 : set of cautiously rationalizable strategy proles
D1 : set of weakly perfectly rationalizable strategy proles
T1 : set of trembling-hand rationalizable strategy proles
Table 3: No relationship between most renements
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